Introduction
Cloud computing-otherwise known as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), or on-demand virtual-machine instantiation, provides some exciting opportunities for systems administrators and physicists alike in the HEP community.
Faced with the problem of supporting legacy OS's after a refresh, we aimed to examine what it would take to implement a cloud-computing solution with a minimum of extra expense and software. This involved integration with Condor (our batch system), ensuring security, access to data, and adequate performance.
Condor Tie-In
The batch system can be used in two ways, one where it just executes a wrapper to boot the VM and another where it boots the VM itself using a feature known as the Condor "VM Universe"
Running Jobs
First, condor is used to manage the deployment of VM's. The user sees as an "API" just their regular condor job with an additional few flags: Command = /usr/local/racf/vm Args = -i sl_53 +VM_Command = "/phenix/u/chris/cornfop/exe/job.sh" +VM_Args = "/phenix/data33/run10/data_file $(ClusterID)"
The user modifies the command and arguments to be our wrapper and provides extra flags determining what runs inside the virtual machine.
Job Parameters and Setup
Condor provides a number of environment variables and overwrites, we provide these inside the VM by taking the environment of the wrapper and injecting it to the VM. The working directory and temp areas are created inside the VM by the setup script and the environment is loaded prior to user job execution.
Condor Instantiation
Condor has a concept called the "VM Universe" that allows the actual instantiation to be handled by the condor daemons. The ability to control exactly how this was done was added in recent versions. In versions of condor >7.6 there is a flag called LIBVIRT_XML_SCRIPT that allows the administrator to control the logic of how images are instantiated. This script takes the job-description as input and outputs the XML description used by libvirt to instantiate the VM.
This can replace the custom instantiation scripts because it allows us to validate whether the image is trusted and therefore whether or not to do the port-remapping.
Image Distribution
Images are stored on a webserver and distributed over HTTP. This enables us to leverage well understood tools like SQUID for performance and scalability. Images are cached on the local node, and updates are pulled each time a job starts.
Getting Images and Updates
A checksum file is maintained at the URL where images are fetched from. Each job gets this file and compares it to a copy on the local node. Images whose checksums differ are re-downloaded. In pseudo-python the refresh cycle looks like this: Images are compressed on the webserver and are uncompressed as they are downloaded to the node. The checksums are of the uncompressed images since verification is done on the node once a download/unzip is complete.
Image Maintenance
Images will be kept patched by periodically booting the master copies, running a "yum update", recomputing the checksums, compressing them, and uploading the new image and checksum file to the master webserver.
Security Concerns
We allow trusted images only for now; this solves two problems-security and image contextualization.
Untrusted images can be run only behind a NAT that remaps ports below 1024 to high ports. NFS and other services on our network use the fact that only root can bind to "low" ports to authenticate clients.
Users run a setuid-binary to instantiate the images, but this can only be run underneath each Condor job so other users and jobs cannot invoke it (parent process must be condor_starter). This is secure under Linux as we check that the parent exe-symlink is correct: /proc/<ppid>/exe -> /usr/bin/condor_starter.
I/O Methods

Job Input/Output
Most users will utilize their already-existing NFS home-directories for their code and will be analyzing data there as well.
Images can be optionally provided by users and mounted inside virtual machines as a /data partition, likewise a /scratch partition can be exported after a the job is complete.
Job Scratch Area
Because the performance of qcow2 with an unallocated backing store is not optimal, jobs that plan on using large amounts of scratch space can optionally request a blank image be created for them and mounted as a directory specified by a flag in the job 
Security cont.
Inside trusted VM's we inject a custom rc.local that inspects the job information uploaded in the image, becomes the appropriate UID and executes the indicated code.
Inside untrusted VM's, perhaps paradoxically, users can claim-to-be-root since ports are re-mapped and they can do no harm on the network. 
